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Abstract—In order to detect and prevent DoS/DDoS attacks 
that exploit IP address spoofing, the IP traceback technique has 
been introduced and developed with variety of methods including 
packet marking. By means of inserting marking information on 
the travel path into rarely used fields in the header of IP packets, 
the destination host can trace back the original-source location of 
received packets, which is useful for supporting detection of 
attacks. Many schemes of packet marking IP traceback have 
been proposed, but still have nevertheless some drawbacks such 
as low traceback rate, heavy computational overhead due to 
high-required number of marked packets and marking size. In 
this paper, we proposed PLA DFM, a novel efficient enhanced 
solution of Deterministic Flow Marking based on adaptation with 
real traffic characteristics. The analytic result shows that the 
proposed solution provides a far higher successful mark rate, 
lower computational overhead compared to the original scheme 
and other marking techniques with unnoticeable increased traffic 
size. 
Keywords—DoS/DDoS, IP Spoofing, IP traceback, Packet 
Marking, Deterministic Packet Marking, Derterministics Flow 
Marking. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Nowadays, Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDoS) remain the largest challenges of 
network security. In DoS/DDoS attack, the attackers may 
generate and send a huge number of attack packets to the 
victim in a short period of time. Due to the stateless and 
anonymous nature of the Internet, attackers can easily spoof 
the source IP address. It is extremely difficult for the attack 
detection and prevention solutions to identify the real original 
source of the attack.  To address this problem, the IP traceback 
technique has been introduced as a way to support schemes of 
attack detection [2][3][4][5][6][8].  
The traceback technique enables victims to reconstruct the 
travel path of a specific packet or to know the address of the 
location in which the packet originated regardless of whether 
the IP source address contained in the packet is spoofed or not. 
Traceback is neither the solution of attack detection nor attack 
prevention, but this technique can support these solutions to 
know the real source of suspicious packets during or after 
attack without using the source IP address field in the IP 
header. Traceback techniques can be classified into 5 main 
categories: link testing, messages, logging, packet marking 
and hybrid schemes. In link testing schemes, the attack 
sources are traced manually from victims to upstream links for 
finding the links, which carry the attacked traffic. The 
message schemes use ICMP messages to reconstruct the travel 
path of the packets. Logging schemes query logged databases 
maintained at every router on the travel path and apply some 
data mining algorithms to determine the origin of the packet. 
Packet marking schemes try to insert into the IP header some 
router information, which can be used for identifying the 
original source location of packets. This paper focuses on the 
fourth group, packet marking. In fact, there are several packet-
marking–based traceback proposals, but the problem of 
relatively low successful marking with a high number of 
processed packets still remains. 
In this paper, we focus on packet-marking-traceback 
technique and propose the PLA DFM (Packet Length 
Adaptive Deterministic Flow Marking) scheme, an enhanced 
solution of the packet marking traceback technique DFM 
Based on the result of analyzing the real network traffic from 
the CAIDA 2013 dataset [1], we evaluate the performance of 
PLA DFM. The result shows that PLA DFM has a much 
higher rate of successful marking compared to the original 
DFM. The marked packet rate and the marked size rate are 
lower than DFM with a slightly increased size.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II 
provides an overview of the related work and background on 
marking traceback techniques. Section III describes some 
characteristics of real network traffics, limitation of the DFM 
technique and the main principle of our solution so-called 
PLA DFM, which is the modified enhanced version of DFM. 
Section IV analyzes the performance of PLA DFM and makes 
a comparison to the original one. Section V presents the 
conclusion of the paper and some future work. 
II. RELATED WORK AND BACKGROUND ON PACKET 
MARKING IP TRACEBACK 
 In the packet marking traceback technique, marking 
information of some or all routers in the travel path is sent to 
the destination. Marking information is often the addresses of 
routers. The destination uses this information for tracing back 
to the location of the original source of the packets without 
using the IP source address field in the IP header. A marking 
process inserts the marking information into rarely-used fields 
in the IP header before forwarding packets to the destination. 
There are two main techniques of packet marking: PPM 
(Probabilistic Packet Marking) and DPM (Deterministic Packet 
Marking). 
A. PPM and DPM 
Introduced by Savage et al.[2], in PPM all routers on the 
travel path of a packet are involved in the marking process. 
Packets passed through a router will be marked based on a 
fixed probability p=0.04. Marking information is the edge 
between the current router and the previous one. The edge-id 
is produced by the “XOR” of IP addresses of these two nodes 
and divided into small segments. Each segment is selected 
randomly to be stored inside 16 bits of Identification field in 
the header of a marked packet as a sample of the travel path. 
When the destination receives enough samples, the path can 
be reconstructed. The main advantages of the PPM scheme 
are: simple, easy to implement, no increment of packet size, 
and relatively low marking computational overhead at routers. 
However, the noticeable drawbacks are the high overhead 
requirement for path reconstruction at the destination, low 
successful-traceback rate, and the problem of overwriting the 
information in marked packets that leads to a high false rate 
[11]. 
In order to overcome the disadvantages and improve the 
efficiency of PPM, some other proposals have been 
introduced. J.  Liu, et al. used dynamic probability based on 
TTL decrement for selecting marking packets in Dynamic 
PPM scheme (DPPM) [3]. V. Paruchuri, et al. proposed the 
Authenticated AS traceback [4], in which the AS 
(Autonomous System) number is used instead of the IP 
addreses. The scheme also changes the probability to fixed 
value of 1/6. Similarly, the Efficient AS DoS Traceback 
(EAST) scheme [5] introduced by Mohammed Alenezi et al. 
uses AS number as marking information with the dynamic 
probability p=1/(a-2) where a is the AS distance from the 
source to the destination. EAST scheme also uses, 8 bits of 
TOS fields in the IP header for marking containers and 
therefore the entire marking information of each AS can be 
put in only one packet. However, these schemes do not 
decrease much the computational overhead at the destination.  
Introduced by Belenky et al.[6][7], DPM marks IP packets 
of ingress traffics only at edge routers of ISP networks. The 
marking information is the IP address of the ingress port on 
edge routers. 16 bits of the Identification field are used for 
storing marking information and the Reserved Flag bit is used 
for indicating if the packet is marked or not (Marked Flag). 32 
bits of marking information are segmented into small parts, 
which can be embedded in the header of an IP packet. During 
DPM marking, each segment is selected with probability 
p=1/K where K is the number of packets required for marking. 
DPM can traceback under DoS attacks better than PPM and 
can be used in on-the-fly systems thanks to the lower 
computational requirement at the destination. Besides, the 
scheme does not increase packet size and can prevent attackers 
from spoofing marking. However, the false positive rate is still 
relatively high especially under DDoS attacks. 
For enhancement, the extended DPM [8] proposed by V.K. 
Soundar Rajam et al. and the flexible DPM [11] introduced by  
Yang Xiang et al. use 8 bits more from the TOS field to 
expand the marking container up to 25 bits. This modification 
decreases the required number of packets for successfully 
tracing back but may result in collision because these bits have 
been used for Differentiated Services Code Point (in RFC 
2474) [9] and Explicit Congestion Notification (in RFC 3168) 
[10]. Although these enhanced solutions improve the 
efficiency, DPM schemes still retain some chronic drawbacks 
including: high computational requirement and low accurate 
tracebacked location. 
B. Deterministic Flow Marking (DFM) Technique 
Proposed by Vahid Aghaei-Foroushani et al.[12], DFM is 
an improved scheme of DPM. Like DPM, the marking process 
of DFM is carried out at edge routers for ingress traffic. 
However, DFM does not mark all incoming packets but only K 
first packets for each incoming flow. A TCP/UDP flow is 
defined by 5-tuple parameters including source and destination 
IP addresses, L4 protocol type, source and destination ports. 
For determining an ICMP flow, 6-tuple parameters are used: 
source and destination IP addresses, L4 protocol type (ICMP), 
ICMP Code, ICMP Type and ICMP ID. Besides, there are two 
constraint parameters:  
• Inactive Timeout: the interval between two consecutive 
unidirectional packets in a flow must be smaller than 
Inactive Timeout, otherwise those two packets belong to 
two flows. 
• Active Timeout: the existing time of a flow shall not exceed 
Active Timeout 
If one of these two criteria is violated, a flow is discarded and a 
new one is created for the next packet. In DFM, the marking 
information is expanded up to 60 bits including:  
(i) 32 bits of IP address of an egress port on the edge router, 
where a flow is forwarded to the next hop,  
(ii) 12 bits of NIID, the unique value indicates the MAC 
address or VLAN ID of ingress port, where the flow enters to 
the Internet and  
(iii) 16 bits of NodeID, the value to identify the unique host 
sending the flow to the edge router.  
The number of packets needed for marking in each flow 
depends on the usage of the fields in the IP header for 
containing marking information. DFM does not specify the 
fields in the IP header that can be used for marking. Except for 
the 16 bits of Identification and 1 bit of Reserved Flag, the 
scheme can use other rarely-used fields, including 8 bits of 
TOS and 13 bits of Fragment Offset. TABLE I. shows the 
required numbef of packets K for a successfully-marked flow 
depending on the usage of the fields in IP header for marking. 
TABLE I.  THE USAGE OF FIELDS AND REQUIRED PACKET NUMBER IN 
EACH FLOW FOR MARKING IN DFM  
Used fields Size of marking space (bits) K 
Identification, Reserved Flag, TOS 
and Fragment Offset 37 2 
Identification, Reserved Flag and 
TOS  25 3 
Identification, Reserved Flag and 
Fragment Offset 30 3 
Identification and Reserved Flag 17 5 
Marking just only K first packets in each flow, in 
comparison to DPM, the number of marked packets decreases 
by as much as nearly 90% [12]. Therefore, the computational 
overhead of marking at edge routers is also reduced. 
Furthermore, by adding more details in marking information, 
DFM scheme provides the ability to trace back closer to the 
original source. Besides, in order to ensure that compromised 
routers in the network path have not changed the marking 
information, the DFM scheme introduces the option of 
authentication. Thanks to receiving public keys of edge routers, 
the destination could verify the marking information and 
eliminate possibility of modification by malfunctioning routers. 
III. OUR PROPOSED PACKET LENGTH ADAPTIVE DFM 
Due to the outperforming characteristics of the DFM 
technique, it inspired us to study and develop an enhanced 
version of the DFM scheme.  In order to understand better the 
pending problem of DFM that we try to solve, we at first 
analyze the DFM’s marking performance that essentially 
depends on the Internet traffic characteristics. 
A. Analysis of the Internet traffic characteristics and the 
DFM’s performance 
To improve the efficiency in marking IP traceback, it is 
necessary to reduce the number of marked packets. Although 
the number and total size of marked packets decrease much and 
a higher traceback rate can be gained in comparison to DPM, 
DFM needs fixed K first packets in each flow for holding 
marking information. A flow, which has less than K packets, 
will not be marked successfully and therefore the destination 
will not be able to trace the origin of those packets. 
To study the rate of successful marking in DFM, we 
analyzed and got statistics of packet distribution and length of 
the first packet in each flow from 5 million flows in CAIDA 
2013 traffic dataset [1]. We have employed the Scapy tool [16] 
to get sequenced packets in the traffic dataset and assign them 
into flows. The value of INACTIVE TIMEOUT and ACTIVE 
TIMEOUT were set to 15 seconds and 30 minutes respectively, 
these values were chosen based on the default values of some 
other prevalent protocols such as NetFlow [13]. For each flow, 
we recorded the number of packets and the first packet length 
then stored the information into a database. The analysis result 
presented in Fig. 1 is extracted by querying the database. As 
seen in Fig. 1, flows that have only one packet account for a 
major portion (over 40%). With this distribution, even in the 
case of K=2, the rate of successful marking is quite low (under 
60%). 
 
Fig. 1. Distribution of number of packets in a flow 
In DFM, the higher the number of packets needed for 
marking, the lower success rates of marking. In order to 
increase the capability of successful marking, marking 
information should be carried out in as few packets as possible. 
Instead of putting marking information to headers of K packets, 
more fields in the IP header are used to afford 60-bit DFM 
marking information. By means of involving more fields in the 
IP header for marking, the fewer packets in a flow are needed, 
consequently producing a higher traceback rate. 
B. Packet Length Adaptive DFM 
The main idea of our proposed enhanced DFM version - 
PLA DFM has two main purposes: 
(1) PLA DFM tries to push all marking information into the 
first packet where possible in order to reduce the required 
number of marked packets, consequently increasing the 
marking rate. 
(2) A length threshold MT is set to avoid packet fragmentation 
It can be seen that with the IP header fields used in DFM, 
60 bits marking information could not be inserted entirely into 
the header of only 1 packet. Hence, in our PLA DFM, the 
Options field is used with the length of 2 datagram units, 
equivalent to 8 bytes. PLA DFM also introduces another 
problem: the required expansion of the IP header may increase 
the packet size beyond the network path MTU, and lead to 
fragmentation. However, as seen in Fig. 2, lengths of the first 
packet in most flows are relatively small. Nearly 90% of flows 
have the first packet size varying under 200 bytes, whilst the 
total packet range can be up to 1500 bytes. Therefore, if a 
length threshold is defined and this marking method is applied 
just for flows that have the first packet length smaller than the 
threshold, the rate of successful marking will be improved. 
 
Fig. 2. Distribution of length of the first packet 
Like DFM, PLA DFM marking process is handled just only 
at edge routers of ISP networks and applied for the ingress 
traffic. The marking information for each arrival ingress flow 
comprises 32 bits of egress IP address, 12 bits of NIID and 16 
bits of NodeID. In order to distinguish a marked packet from 
unmarked ones, 1 Marked Flag bit is indicated. PLA DFM uses 
Reserved Flag for this indication. If the Reserved Flag bit is set 
to 1, the packet is marked and vice versa, the packet is a normal 
one if Reserved Flag is zero. As discussed above, we define a 
threshold of packet length called Mark Threshold (MT). In 
PLA DFM, marking information of each flow is conveyed in 
two manners: 
Manner 1:  If the first packet length is smaller than or equal to 
MT, PLA DFM exploits 16 bits of the ID field and 48 bits of 
the Options field for placing marking information as seen in 
Fig. 3. 
Manner 2: If the first packet length is greater than MT, 
marking information is put into the rarely used fields in the IP 
header of K first packets in the same way the original DFM 
scheme does (i.e. Identification, Reserved Flag, TOS and 
Fragment Offset field). 
 
Fig. 3. Header structure of the first packet marked by PLA DFM Manner 1 
 However, in order to avoid the conflict, which may be 
caused with Differentiated Services Code Point (in RFC 2474) 
[8] and Explicit Congestion Notification (in RFC 3168) [9], 
PLA DFM does not employ the TOS field as the marking 
container. Consequently, only the two later circumstances in 
Table I are developed in our PLA DFM: 
(1) Insert marking information in the header of 3 first packets 
(K=3). The fields of Identification, Reserved Flag and 
Fragment Offset are used for marking and the total 
container size is T=30 bits in each marked packet. Due to 
segmentation, except for M=20 bits marking information 
segment, each marked packet needs S=log2(3)=2bits for 
segment order.   
(2) Insert marking information in the header of 5 first packets 
(K=5). The fields of Identification and Reserved Flag are 
deployed. In this case, the values are T=17, S=3 and 
M=12. 
 As the marking information is divided into segments and 
sent in different IP packets, if there are concurrently many 
sources spoofing the same flow properties and sending packets 
to the same destination, the victim may not be able to 
distinguish the origin of received marking segments and hence 
may be confused trying to trace separately these sources. To 
prevent this problem, the option of using a marking checksum 
is introduced in PLA DFM. A checksum value is calculated 
from marking information for each flow and sent along with a 
segment in each marked packet. By comparing received 
checksum values, the destination host can differentiate the 
origins of marking segments and reconstruct accurately the 
marking information even if it receives packets from many 
sources that spoof the same flow properties.  
The option of using marking checksum results in 
requirement of more space in marked packets. For the scheme 
of K=3 with a total of 30 dedicated bits, 1 bit is used for 
Marked Flag, M=20 bits for marking information segment, S=2 
bits for segment order, there are up to C=7 bits in each packet 
used for holding the marking checksum value. In this scheme, 
K=3 packets are enough for successfully marking, both with or 
without marking checksum option. Whilst in the case of K=5 
with a total of 17 dedicated bits, 1 bit is used for Marked Flag, 
M=12 bits for marking segment, S=3 bits for segment order, 
there is not enough space for checksum value. To use this 
option, there must be K=7 packets for marking successfully a 
flow and these parameters are M=12, S=3 and C=4 bits for 
checksum value. 
 An important factor in PLA DFM is to set the marking 
threshold MT value. Choosing a small MT decreases the 
number of flows marked by expanding the packet header, and 
results in having a lower rate of successful marking, but 
eliminates the risk of packet fragmentation. The MT value is 
selected based on the minimum MTU of network links in the 
network path. Because 8 bytes are added onto the header of 
each packet marked by this method, the MT value may be 
calculated by subtracting 8 bytes from the minimum MTU. 
TABLE II.  lists MTU link values of some common physical 
networks [14][15] and the corresponding MTs. 
TABLE II.  SOME COMMON MTUS AND CORRESPONDING MTS [14][15] 
Physical net work MTU MT 
Point To Point (RFC1661) 296 288 
ARCNET  508 500 
X. 25 576 568 
IEEE 802.3 1492 1484 
Ethernet 1500 1492 
 The marking algorithm with the option of using marking 
checksum at edge routers is presented in TABLE III.  
TABLE III.  THE ALGORITHM OF PLA DFM WITH THE OPTION OF USING 
MARKING CHECKSUM 
1.FOR EACH arrival_packet 
2. IF arrival_packet belongs to an existed active current_flow THEN 
3.  IF current_flow.NeededPackets >0 THEN 
4.   CALL current_flow.DFM_Marking with arrival_packet 
5. ELSE 
6.  INIT  new_active_flow  
7.  OBTAIN Marking_Information 
8.  IF arrival_packet.Total_length <= MT THEN 
9.   SET arrival_packet.Ihl_field to arrival_packet.Ihl_field + 2 
10.   PUT Marking_Information into arrival_packet.Id_field  
            and arrival_packet.Options_field 
11.   SET arrival_packet.Reserved_Flag to 1 
12.   SET new_active_flow.NeededPackets to 0 
13.  ELSE 
14.   CALCULATE DFM_Check_Sum with  
           Marking_Information 
15.   PUT Marking_Information and DFM_Check_Sum                                           
           into arrival_packet Marking_Segments_Array 
16.   SET new_active_flow.NeededPackets to K 
17.   CALL current_flow.DFM_Marking with arrival_packet 
18. RECALCULATE arrival_packet.IP_Header_Checksum 
19. FORWARD arrival_packet 
20. FOR EACH active_flow 
21.  IF active_flow.Is_TimeOut THEN 
22.   DISPOSE active_flow 
 
23.flow.DFM_Marking (packet) 
24.  PUT flow. Marking_Segments_Array[K-flow.NeededPackets]  
   into packet.Id_field and packet.FragmentOffset_field* 
25.  SET packet. Reserved_Flag to 1 
26.  DECREAMENT flow.NeededPackets 
* applied for K=3 
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
In order to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed solution 
and compare to the original DFM, we analyze the real network 
traffic from CAIDA 2013 dataset, then evaluate performance 
statistically for both DFM and PLA DFM solutions with 3 
schemes: K=3, K=5 and K=7.  
In the schemes of K=3 and K=7, PLA DFM adopts the 
option of either using marking checksum or not. For the K=5 
circumstance, the marking checksum option is not supported 
due to lack of space for containing this value. Concerning the 
marking threshold, we start at MT=288 with the assumption 
that the Point To Point (in RFC 1661) [15] appears commonly 
in most of network paths because this protocol is used over 
many types of physical networks and supports most of 
transmission standards such as Ethernet, ATM, SONET/SDH, 
etc. Moreover, the MTU value set by the protocol is quite 
lower than the ones of other data link protocols. To study the 
effectiveness of choosing MT thresholds, we also analyze and 
get statistical parameters for other MTs and compared to the 
first case. 
Practically, we developed a Scapy-based python tool, 
which can extract, read characteristics of every packet in the 
dataset and assign them into flows. The Sqlite database tool 
[17] is employed to manage all extracted flows. For accuracy, 
only completed flows are taken into account (i.e. flows in 
which one of the two TIMEOUT conditions described in II.B is 
met). The completed flows are tracked continuously in time in 
the dataset. After each 100.000 completed flows, we get the 
statistics and calculate some major metrics for each scheme. It 
shows that the starting point of traffic capture affects the 
performance much. As seen in Fig. 4 Fig. 5 Fig. 6, performance 
at the beginning is fluctuated strongly since a lot of ongoing 
flows are captured in the middle of the flows at the starting 
point. When the number of flows is big enough, the impact of 
the starting point fades out and the performance gets stable. 
The calculated metrics used for the performance comparison 
include: 
1. Successful mark rate (SMR): The rate between number of 
flows that have enough packets to carry entirely marking 
information and total flow number in the traffic. 
2. Marked packet rate (MPR): The number of marked packets 
out of total packet number in the traffic. 
3. Marked size rate (MSR): The total size of marked packets 
including expansion amount (if applicable) out of the size 
of entire traffic. 
Fig. 4 Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show the successful mark rate of 
PLA DFM scheme with MT=288 outperforming DFM in all 3 
cases. As shown in Fig. 4, the successful mark rate of PLA 
DFM maintains stable over 95% (K=3), 94% (K=5) and 93% 
(K=7) while marking rate of DFM is just under 45%(K=3), 
35% (K=5) and 25% (K=7). 
Regarding the marked packet rate, PLA DFM marks fewer 
packets in each flow and consequently the rate is lower than 
DFM as shown in Fig. 5 The mark packet rate of DFM in case 
of K=3, K=5 and K=7 are about 8%, 11% and 13% respectively 
while the MPR of PLA DFM is approximately 5%.  
Similarly, the total size of marked packets in PLA DFM is 
considerably smaller than the marked size in DFM. As seen in 
Fig. 6, with the same K, the marked size rate of PLA DFM is 
just half of the DFM marked size rate. The comparison among 
PLA DFM schemes with various K and MT values in TABLE IV. 
shows that the successful mark rate, marked packet rate and 
marked size rate are changed unnoticeably. The reason is that 
most of the first packets in flows have a size smaller than 200 
bytes. Therefore, incrementing of MT does not affect much the 
number of flows marked by using the Options field in the IP 
header. With this result, the MT value around 288 should be 
used to tradeoff between a high successful mark rate and the 
risk of packet fragmentation. 
 
Fig. 4. SMR of DFM schemes and PLA DFM schemes with MT=288 
 
Fig. 5. MPR of DFM schemes and PLA DFM schemes with MT=288 
 
Fig. 6. MSR of DFM schemes and PLA DFM schemes with MT=288 
TABLE IV.  COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT PLA DFM SCHEMES WITH VARIOUS 
K AND MT 
MT K SMR MPR MSR 
288 
3 95.11 4.40 1.11 
5 94.26 4.68 1.39 
7 93.66 4.91 1.61 
500 
3 96.95 4.36 1.09 
5 96,65 4.58 1.35 
7 96.15 4.78 1.56 
568 
3 97.18 4.26 1.07 
5 96.92 4.55 1.34 
7 96.46 4.74 1.55 
Survey on 5 million flows in the traffic of the CAIDA 2013 dataset 
In PLA DFM, with the flows marked by using expansion of 
Options field, the additional packet length leads to an increase 
of total traffic size in the network. As seen in TABLE V. the 
increased size is not considerable compared to the total traffic 
size. The increased size rate does not depend on K and 
maintains stable under 0.05% with various MT values. 
TABLE V.  THE RATE OF INCREASED SIZE IN PLA DFM 
MT Total original size (bytes) 
Increased size 
(bytes) Rate (%) 
288 85,209,121,130 36,390,376 0.043 
500 85,209,121,130 37,503,744 0.044 
568 85,209,121,130 37,668,640 0.044 
 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 In this paper, we propose an enhanced solution of packet 
marking IP traceback - PLA DFM and compare the solution 
with the original DFM scheme with 4 major metrics: the 
successful mark rate, marked packet rate, marked size rate and 
the percentage of increased size. 
According to the research result, PLA DFM makes use of 
the characteristics of the actual traffic that the length of the first 
packet in each flow is often smaller than that of the others; and 
the flows which have number of packets smaller than needed 
one for successfully marking by DFM accounts for a major 
portion and improves performance. Using a flexible 
mechanism in marking decided by the length of the first 
packet, the successful mark rate of PLA DFM is respectably 
higher than the original scheme with the unnoticeable increase 
of the packet size. Moreover the amount and total size of 
marked packets are much decreased in comparison with the 
original DFM. These are useful for implementation using 
independent equipment attached outside edge routers.  
For future work, the research will focus on the capacity of 
marking and traceback in the condition of denial of service 
attack, application and implementation of the scheme in 
detecting and preventing attacks on the fly. Measurement of 
some system parameters such as computational overhead, 
response time etc. also needs to be carried out. 
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